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Abstract—Face authentication systems are becoming increas-
ingly prevalent, especially with the rapid development of Deep
Learning technologies. However, human facial information is easy
to be captured and reproduced, which makes face authentication
systems vulnerable to various attacks. Liveness detection is an
important defense technique to prevent such attacks, but existing
solutions did not provide clear and strong security guarantees,
especially in terms of time.
To overcome these limitations, we propose a new liveness
detection protocol called Face Flashing that significantly increases
the bar for launching successful attacks on face authentication
systems. By randomly flashing well-designed pictures on a screen
and analyzing the reflected light, our protocol has leveraged
physical characteristics of human faces: reflection processing at
the speed of light, unique textual features, and uneven 3D shapes.
Cooperating with working mechanism of the screen and digital
cameras, our protocol is able to detect subtle traces left by an
attacking process.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of Face Flashing, we imple-
mented a prototype and performed thorough evaluations with
large data set collected from real-world scenarios. The results
show that our Timing Verification can effectively detect the time
gap between legitimate authentications and malicious cases. Our
Face Verification can also differentiate 2D plane from 3D objects
accurately. The overall accuracy of our liveness detection system
is 98.8%, and its robustness was evaluated in different scenarios.
In the worst case, our system’s accuracy decreased to a still-high
97.3%.
I. INTRODUCTION
User authentication is a fundamental security mechanism.
However, passwords, the most widely used certificate for
authentication, have widely known drawbacks in security and
usability: strong passwords are difficult to memorize, whereas
convenient ones provide only weak protection. Therefore, re-
searchers have long sought alternative security certificates and
methods, among which biometric authentication is a promising
candidate. Biometric authentication verifies inherent factors
instead of knowledge factors (e.g., passwords) and possession
factors (e.g., secure tokens). Some biometric-based schemes
have already been proposed. They exploit users’ fingerprints,
voice spectra, and irises. Face-based schemes have become
increasingly widespread because of rapid developments in face
recognition technologies and deep learning algorithms.
However, in contrast to other biometrics (i.e., iris and retina
recognition) that are difficult for adversaries to acquire and
duplicate, human faces can be easily captured and reproduced,
which makes face authentication systems vulnerable to attacks.
For example, adversaries could obtain numerous photographs
and facial videos from social networks or stolen smartphones.
Furthermore, these images can be easily utilized to build facial
models of target individuals and bypass face authentication
systems, benefiting from architectural advances in General-
Purpose Graphics Processing Unit (GPGPU) and advanced
image synthesizing techniques. Such attacks can be as simple
as presenting a printed photograph, or as sophisticated as dy-
namically generating video streams by using video morphing
techniques.
To counter such attacks, liveness detection methods have
been developed during the past decade. Crucial to such meth-
ods are challenge-response protocols, in which challenges are
sent to the user who then responds in accordance with dis-
played instructions. The responses are subsequently captured
and verified to ensure that they come from a real human being
instead of being synthesized. Challenges typically adopted in
studies have included blinking, reading words or numbers
aloud, head movements, and handheld camera movements.
However, these methods do not provide a strong security
guarantee. Adversaries may be able to bypass them by using
modern computers and technology. More specifically, as Li
et al. [17] argued, many existing methods are vulnerable to
media-based facial forgery (MFF) attacks. Adversaries have
even been able to bypass FaceLive, the method proposed by
Li et al. and designed to defend against MFF attacks, by
deliberately simulating the authentication environment.
We determined that the root cause of this vulnerability
is the lack of strict time verification of a response. That is,
the time required for a human to respond to a movement
challenge is long and varies among individuals. Adversaries
can synthesize responses faster than legitimate users by using
modern hardware and advanced algorithms. Therefore, previ-
ous protocols could not detect liveness solely on the basis of
response time.
To address this vulnerability, we propose a new challen-
geresponse protocol called Face Flashing. The core proposal
of this protocol is to emit light of random colors from a liquid-
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crystal display (LCD) screen (our challenge) and use a camera
to capture the light reflected from the face (our response). The
response generation process requires negligible time, whereas
forging the response would require substantially more time.
By leveraging this substantial difference, Face Flashing thus
provides effective security in terms of time.
The security of the Face Flashing protocol is based on two
factors: time and shape. We use linear regression models and a
neural network model to verify each factor, respectively. Our
verification of time ensures that the response has not been
falsified, whereas verification of shape ensures that the face
shape is stereo and face-like. By using these two verifications,
our protocol simultaneously satisfies the three essentials of
a secure liveness detection protocol. First, we leverage an
unpredictable challenge, flashing a sequence of effectively
designed, randomly generated images. Second, our responses
are difficult to forge not only because of the difference in time
but also in the effort required to generate responses. In par-
ticular, legitimate users need not perform any extra steps, and
legitimate responses are generated automatically (through light
reflection) and instantaneously, whereas adversaries must ex-
pend substantially more effort to synthesize quality responses
to bypass our system. Third, we can effectively verify the
genuineness of responses by using our challenges. Specifically,
we verify users on the basis of the received responses; for
example, by checking whether the shiny area in the response
accords with the challenge (lighting area in challenges will
always produce highly intensive responses in a local area).
The detailed security analysis and our adversary model are
presented in later sections of this paper.
Contributions. Our paper’s contributions are three-fold:
• A new liveness detection protocol, Face Flashing.
We propose Face Flashing, a new liveness detection
protocol, that flashes randomly generated colors and
verifies the reflected light. In our system, adversaries
do not have the time required to forge responses during
authentication.
• Effective and efficient verifications of timing and
face. By employing working mechanisms of screens
and digital cameras, we design a method that uses lin-
ear regression models to verify the time. Furthermore,
by using a well-designed neural network model, our
method verifies the face shape. By combining these
two verification procedures, our protocol provides
strong security.
• Implementation of a prototype and evaluations. We
implement a prototype and conduct thorough evalua-
tions. The evaluation results suggest that our method
performs reliably in different settings and is highly
accurate.
Roadmap. This paper is organized as follows: Section II
introduces the background and Section III describes our ad-
versary model and preset assumptions. Section IV details the
design of our protocol. Section V presents the security anal-
ysis. Section VI elucidates experiment settings and evaluation
results. Section VII summarizes related works. Section VIII
and Section IX discusses limitations and future works. Finally,
Section X concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we describe the typical architecture of face-
based authentication systems (Section II-A). Subsequently,
we briefly review attacks and solutions of liveness detection
(Section II-B).
A. Architecture of Face Authentication Systems
A typical architecture of face authentication system is
illustrated in Fig 1. It is divided into two parts: front-
end devices and the back-end server. The front-end devices
comprises camera and auxiliary sensors such as flash lamps,
microphones. The back-end server contains two main modules:
a liveness detection module and a face recognition module.
When the user commences the authentication process, the
liveness detection module is initiated and sends generated
parameters to front-end devices (Step 1). Subsequently, the
front-end devices synthesize challenges according to the re-
ceived parameters and deliver them to the user (Step 2). After
receiving the challenges, the user makes expressions, such as
smiling blinking, as responses. The sensors in the front-end
devices capture such responses and encode them (Step 3).
Either in real time or in post processing, the front-end devices
send the captured responses to the liveness detection module
in the back-end server (Step 4). The liveness detection module
gathers all decoded data and checks whether the user is an
actual human being. If so, the liveness detection module selects
some faces among all the responses and delivers them to the
face recognition module to determine the identity of the user
(Step 5).
Fig. 1: A typical face authentication system.
B. Attacks and Solutions on Liveness Detection
In recent years, plenty of attacks have been developed
to exploit the flaw that face recognition algorithms cannot
determine whether a photograph taken by the front-end camera
is captured from a real face, even if the recognition accuracy
of some has exceeded human beings. In this study, we divide
attacks into four categories and organize them as a tree, known
as the attack tree, which is displayed in Fig 2. We first separate
attacks into two categories: static and dynamic. Static attacks
refer to the use of static objects, such as photographs, plastic
masks, and paper, as well as transformations of these objects
(e.g., folding, creating holes through them, and assembling
them into certain shapes). Attacks using dynamic or partially
dynamic objects are categorized into dynamic branch. Sub-
sequently, we separate attacks into four subcategories: two-
dimensional (2D) static, three-dimensional (3D) static, 2D
dynamic, and 3D dynamic. The 3D branches refer to attacks
that use stereo objects, including sculptures, silicone masks,
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and robots. More precisely, these objects must have notable
stereo characters of human faces, such as a prominent nose,
concave eye sockets and salient cheekbones; otherwise, the
attacks are categorized into 2D branches. Organized by this
attacking tree, a brief review of relative attacks and solutions
is presented below.
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Fig. 2: The attacking tree.
In the 2D static branch, photograph-based attacks are
the predominant form of attack. They are easily launched
and effective at compromising primary recognition algorithms.
Tracking eye movement was the first method proposed to
counter such attacks. Jee et al. [9] proposed a method for
detecting eyes in a sequence of facial images. Variations
around the eyes are calculated, and whether the face is real
is determined. Their basic assumption is that blinking and the
uncontrolled movements of pupils are human nature behaviors.
However, this method cloud be compromised by an adversary
wearing a mask with eyeholes. A similar idea exploiting
Conditional Random Fields (CRFs) was proposed by Sun et
al. [23]. Its limitation is the same. Subsequently, lip movement
and lip reading methods were developed by Kollreider et
al. [14] for liveness detection. However, their method can also
be fooled using carefully transformed photographs.
To distinguish faces from photographs, Li et al. [16]
leveraged the fact that faces and photographs have different
appearances in frequency space. They conducted 2D Fourier
spectral analysis to extract the high-frequency components of
input images; faces contain more components in the high-
frequency region than do photographs. However, adversaries
can print a high-resolution photograph to bypass this method.
Jukka et al. [18] observed that printed photographs are pix-
elized. That is, a face has more details than a photograph.
Thus, they used a support vector machine (SVM) to extract
microtextures from the input image. Later, Kim et al. [11]
leveraged a more powerful texture descriptor, Local Binary
Pattern (LBP) to enhance performance. They additionally
analyzed the information residing in both the low- and high-
frequency regions. However, all these types of solutions have
a common drawback: low robustness. Motion blur or noise
from the environment impairs their performance. Moreover,
these methods are useless against screen-based attacks [5].
Because of strategies designed to protect against 2D at-
tacks, adversaries have attempted to exploit 3D objects in 3D
static attacks. Thus, researchers have developed novel methods
to defend against these attacks also. Lagorio, et al., [15]
proposed a method to detect 3D facial features. They employed
a two- camera device to ascertain the surface curvature of
the subject seeking authentication. If the surface curvature
is low, the subject is judged to be malicious. Although the
accuracy is almost 100%, the sophisticated device required
is expensive and the computational cost is unacceptable. Fur-
thermore, Wang, et al., [24] leveraged a one-camera, face
alignment algorithm to ascertain 3D shape on the basis that
forged faces are usually flatter than real faces. However, this
method performed unsatisfactorily when applied to spectacle-
wearers because of the limited capability of the face alignment
algorithm.
In response to technological developments, adversaries
must in turn develop more sophisticated attacks. One method
is pasting stereo materials onto photographs. In contrast,
researchers have developed practical and efficient methods to
counter these threats, with the help from developments in
computer vision. The fundamental idea behind these methods
is that adversaries cannot manipulate static objects to simulate
instructed expressions, even if these objects are similar to the
human face. Thus, a common challenge-response protocol has
been adopted, whereby users are asked to make expressions
as the instructions, including happiness, despair, and surprise.
Such systems subsequently compare the captured video with
stored data.
However, more powerful 2D dynamic attacks have been
developed, in which adversaries have exploited advanced deep
learning models and personal computers with powerful pro-
cessors. These attacks work by merging a victim’s facial
characteristics with photographs of the victim and using these
forged photographs to bypass the face recognition algorithm.
Furthermore, even if this operation requires time, adversaries
can prepare photographs beforehand and launch offline attacks,
sending forged photographs to an online authentication system.
To counter these new 2D dynamic threats, some solutions
have been proposed. Bao et al.. [1] introduced a method
based on optical flow technology. The authors found that the
motions of 2D planes and 3D objects in an optical flow field
are the same in translation, rotation, and moving, but not
in swing. They used this difference to identify fake faces.
Unfortunately, two drawbacks undermine this method: first, an
uneven object will fail it; second, the method does not consider
variation in illumination. Kollreider, et al., [13] developed a
method for detecting the positions and velocities of facial
components by using model-based Gabor feature classification
and optical flow pattern matching. However, its performance
was impaired when keen edges were present on the face (e.g.,
spectacles or a beard). The authors admitted that the system is
only error-free if the data contain only horizontal movements.
Findling et al. [8] achieved liveness detection by combining
camera images and movement sensor data. They captured
multiple views of a face while a smartphone was moved.
Li et al. [17] measured the consistency in device movement
detected using inertial sensors and changes in the perspective
of a head captured on video. However, both methods were
demonstrated to be compromised by Xu et al. [27], who
constructed virtual models of victims on the basis of publicly
available photographs of them.
Less adversaries have attempted to launch 3D dynamic
attacks. They can reconstruct a 3D model of a victim’s
3
face [27] in virtual settings but hardly fabricate them in real
scenes. We illustrate the difficulties in launching 3D dynamic
attacks using the following three examples: First, building a
flexible screen that can be molded into the shape of a face is
expensive and may fail because the reflectance from a screen
differs from that of a face. Second, 3D printing a soft mask is
impractical, being limited by the printing materials available
(see Section V-D for a fuller explanation). Third, building
an android is infeasible and intricate and would involve face
animation, precision control, and skin fabrication. Additionally,
building an android is costly, particularly a delicate android
face.
On the basis of the above discussion, we observe that the
current threats are principally 2D dynamic attacks because
static attacks have been effectively neutralized and 3D dynamic
attacks are hard to launch.
III. ADVERSARY MODEL
In this section, we present our proposed adversary model
and assumptions.
We assume adversaries’ goal is to bypass the face authen-
tication systems by impersonating victims, and the objective
of our proposed methods is to raise the bar for such successful
attacks significantly. As will be demonstrated in the limitation
part (section IX), powerful adversaries could bypass our secu-
rity system, but the cost would be much higher than is currently
the case. Particularly, they need to purchase or build special
devices that can do all of the following operations within the
period when the camera scanning a single row: (1) capture
and recognize the randomized challenges, (2) forge responses
depending on the random challenges, and (3) present the forged
responses. For this, adversaries require high-speed cameras,
powerful computers, high-speed I/Os, and a specialized screen
with fast refreshing rate, etc. Therefore, it is difficult to attack
our system.
Adversaries can also launch 3D dynamic attacks, such as
undergoing cosmetic surgery, disguising their faces, or coerc-
ing a victims twin into assisting them. However, launching a
successful 3D dynamic attack is much more difficult than using
existing methods of MFF attack; crucially, identifying such
an attack would be challenging even for humans and would
constitute a Turing Test problem, which is beyond the scope of
this paper. But in either case, our original goal is achieved by
having increased the bar for successful attacks significantly.
Our method relies on the integrity of front-end devices; that
is, that the camera and the hosting system that presents random
challenges and captures responses have not been compromised.
If this cannot be guaranteed, adversaries could learn the
algorithm used to generate random challenges and generate
fake but correct responses beforehand, thus undermining our
system. We believe that assuming the integrity of front-end
devices is reasonable in real-world settings, considering that in
many places the front-end devices can be effectively protected
and their integrity guaranteed (e.g., ATMs and door access
controls). We cannot assume or rely on the integrity of smart-
phones, however. Our proposed techniques are general and can
easily be deployed on different hardware platforms, including
but not limited to smartphones. For simplicity, we choose to
build a prototype and conduct evaluations on smartphones, but
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Fig. 3: Architecture of Face Flashing.
this is only for demonstration purposes. If the integrity of a
smartphone can be guaranteed, by using a trusted platform
module or Samsung KNOX hardware assistance, for example,
our techniques can be deployed on them; otherwise this
should be avoided and the proposed techniques are not tied
to smartphones.
IV. FACE FLASHING
Face Flashing is a challenge-response protocol designed
for liveness detection. In this section, we elaborate its detailed
processes and key techniques to leverage flashing and reflec-
tion.
A. Protocol Processes
The proposed protocol contains seven components, which
are illustrated in Fig 3, and eight steps are required to complete
once challenge-response procedure where the challenge is
flashing light and the response is the light reflected from the
face.
• Step 1: Generation of parameters. Parameters are
produced by the Generator of the Liveness Detection
Module running on the back-end server, which works
closely with the front-end devices. Such parameters
include seed and N. Seed controls how random chal-
lenges are generated, and N determines the total
number of challenges to be used. Communication of
parameters between the back-end server and front-
end devices is protected by standard protocols such
as HTTP and TLS.
• Step 2: Initialization of front-end devices. After
receiving the required parameters, the front-end de-
vices initialize their internal data structures and start
to capture videos from the subject being authenticated
by turning on the Camera.
• Step 3: Presentation of a challenge. Once initialized,
the front-end devices begin to generate challenges
according to the received parameters. Essentially, a
challenge is a picture displayed on a screen during
one refresh period; light is emitted by the screen onto
the subjects face. The challenge can be of two types:
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a background challenge, which displays a pure color,
and a lighting challenge, which displays a lit area over
the background color. More details are specified in
subsequent sections.
• Step 4: Collection of response. The response is the
light that is reflected immediately by the subjects face.
We collect the response through the camera that has
already been activated (in Step 2).
• Step 5: Repetition of challenge-response. Our pro-
tocol repeats Step 3 and 4 for N times. This repetition
is designed to collect enough responses to ensure
high robustness and security so that legitimate users
always pass whereas adversaries are blocked even
if they accidentally guess out the correct challenges
beforehand.
• Step 6: Timing verification. Timing is the most
crucial security guarantee provided by our protocol
and is the fundamental distinction between genuine
and fake responses. Genuine responses are the light
reflected from a human face and are generated through
a physical process that occurs simultaneously over all
points and at the speed of light (i.e., zero delay).
Counterfeit responses, however, would be calculated
and presented sequentially, pixel by pixel (or row by
row), through one or more pipelines. Thus, counterfeit
responses would result in detectable delays. We detect
delays among all the responses to verify their integrity.
• Step 7: Face verification. The legality of the face
is verified by leveraging neural network that incor-
porates with both the shape and textual characters
extracted from the face. This verification is necessary
because without it our protocol is insufficiently strong
to prevent from MFF attacks, and face verification
prolongs the time required by adversaries to forge
a response, which makes the difference from benign
response more obvious. The details are provided in
Section IV-B.
• Step 8: Expression verification. The ability to make
expressions indicates liveness. We verify this ability
by ascertaining whether the detected expression is the
one requested. Specifically, technology from [22] is
embedded in our prototype for detecting and recog-
nizing human expressions.
Details of Step 8 are omitted in this paper so that we
can focus on our two crucial steps: timing and face verifi-
cations. However, expression detection has been satisfactorily
developed and is critical to our focus. Additionally, Step 8
is indispensable because it integrates our security boundary,
which is elucidated in Section V. The face extraction detailed
in the next section is designed so that our two verification
techniques are compatible with this expression detection.
B. Key Techniques
The security guarantees of our proposed protocol are built
on the timing as well as the unique features extracted from
the reflected lights. In the followings, we will first introduce
the model of light reflection, then our algorithm for extracting
faces from video frames, and verifications on time and face.
1) Model of Light Reflection: Consider an image Irgb =
{Ir, Ig, Ib} that is taken from a linear RGB color camera with
black level corrected and saturated pixels removed. The value
of Ic, c ∈ {r, g, b} for a Lambertian surface at pixel position x
is equal to the integral of the product of the illuminant spectral
power distribution E(x, λ), the reflectance R(x, λ) and the
sensor response function Sc(λ):
Ic(x) =
∫
Ω
E(x, λ)R(x, λ)Sc(λ)dλ, c ∈ {r, g, b}
where λ is the wavelength, and Ω is the wavelength range of
all visible spectrum supported by camera sensor. From the Von
Kries coefficient law [3], a simplified diagonal model is given
by:
Ic = Ec ×Rc, c ∈ {r, g, b}
Exploiting this model, by controlling the outside illuminant
E, we can get the reflectance of the object. Specifically, when
Ec for x and y are the same, then
Ic(x)
Ic(y)
=
Rc(x)
Rc(y)
, c ∈ {r, g, b} (1)
This means the lights captured by camera sensor at two
different pixels x and y are proportional to the reflectance of
that two pixels.
Similarly, for the same pixel point x, if applying two
different illuminant lights Ec1 and Ec2, then:
Ic1(x)
Ic2(x)
=
Ec1(x)
Ec2(x)
, c1, c2 ∈ {r, g, b} (2)
In other words, the reflected light captured by the camera in a
certain pixel is proportional to the incoming light of the same
pixel.
Implications of above equations. Eq.(1) and Eq.(2) are
simple but powerful. They are the foundations of our live-
ness detection protocols. Eq.(1) allows us to derive relative
reflectance for two different pixels from the proportion of
captured light from these two pixels. The reflectance is deter-
mined by the characteristics of the human face, including its
texture and 3D shape. Leveraging Eq.(1), we can extract these
characteristics from the captured pixels and further feed them
to a neural network to determine how similar the subject’s face
is to a real human face.
Eq.(2) states that for a given position, when the incoming
light changes, the reflected light captured by the camera
changes proportionally, and crucially, such changes can be
regarded as “simultaneously” to the emission of the incoming
light because light reflection occurs at the speed of light.
Leveraging Eq.(2), we can infer the challenge from the current
received response and detect whether a delay occurs between
the response and the challenge.
2) Face Extraction: To do our verifications, we need to
locate the face and extract it. Furthermore, our verifications
must be performed on regularized faces where pixels in
different frames with the same coordinate represent the same
point on the face. Concretely, when a user’s face is performing
expressions as instructed, it produces head movements and
hand tremors. Thus, using only face detection technology is
insufficient; we must also employ a face alignment algorithm
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that ascertains the location of every landmark on the face and
neutralizes the impacts from movements. Using the alignment
results, we can regularize the frames as we desired, and
the regularized frames also ensure that our verifications are
compatible with the expression detector.
First, We designed Algorithm 1 to quickly extract the
face rectangle from every frame. In Algorithm 1, track(·)
is our face tracking algorithm [7]. It uses the current frame
as the input and employs previously stored frames and face
rectangles to estimate the location of the face rectangle in the
current frame. The algorithm outputs the estimated rectangle
and a confidence degree, ρ. When it is small (ρ < 0.6), we
regard the estimated rectangle as unreliable and subsequently
use detect(·), our face detection algorithm [28], to redetect
the face and ascertain its location. We employ this iterative
process because the face detection algorithm is precise but
slow, whereas the face tracking algorithm is fast but may lose
track of the face. Additionally, the face tracking algorithm is
used to obtain the transformation relationship between faces in
adjacent frames, which facilitates our evaluation of robustness
(Sec VI-D).
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to extract the face.
INPUT: V ideo
OUTPUT: {Fj}
1: for frame in V ideo do
2: Rect, ρ = track(frame)
3: if Rect = ∅ or ρ < 0.6 then
4: Rect = detect(frame)
5: Rect → track(·)
6: end if
7: Fj = frame(Rect)
8: end for
After obtaining face rectangles, {Fj}, we exploit face
alignment algorithm to estimate the location of 106 facial
landmarks [29] on every rectangle. The locations of these
landmarks are shown in Figure 4.
Fig. 4: 106 landmarks.
Further, we use alignment results to regularize every rect-
angle. Particularly, we formalize the landmarks on j-th face as
Lj = (l1, l2, · · · , l106), where li denotes (xi, yi)>, the coordi-
nates of i-th landmark. And, we calculate the transformation
matrix Tj by:
Tj = argminT ||T L˜j − Lmean||2
where Lmean =
∑
j Lj∑
j 1
L˜j =
[
x1 x2 · · · x106
y1 y2 · · · y106
1 1 · · · 1
]
where T is a 3 × 3 matrix contains rotation and shifting
coefficients. We select the best T as Tj that minimizes the
L2 distance between the regularization target Tmean and L˜j ,
the homogeneous matrix of the coordinate matrix. After that,
we regularize the j-th frame by applying the transformation
matrix Tj to every pair of coordinates and extract the cen-
tering 1280x720 rectangle containing the face. For the sake
of simplicity, we use ”frame” to represent these regularized
frames containing only the face 1.
3) Timing Verification: Our timing verification is built on
the nature of how camera and screen work. Basically, both
of them follow the same scheme: refreshing pixel by pixel.
Detailedly, after finishing refreshing one line or column, they
move to the beginning of next line or column and perform
the scanning repeatedly. We can simply suppose an image
is displayed on screen line by line and captured by camera
column by column, ignoring the time gap between refreshing
adjacent pixels within one line or column that is much smaller
than the time needed to jump to the next line or column. In
other words, as to update any specific line on the screen, it
has to wait for a complete frame cycle until all other lines
have been scanned. Similarly, when a camera is capturing an
image, it also has to wait for a frame cycle to refresh a certain
column.
One example is given in Fig 5 to better explain the interest-
ing phenomenon that is leveraged for our timing verification.
Fig 5a shows a screen that is just changing the displaying color
from Red to Green. Since it is scanning horizontally from top
to bottom, the upper part is now updated to Green but the
lower part is still previous color Red. The captured image of
a camera with column scanning pattern from left to right is
shown in Fig 5b, which shows an obvious color gradient from
Red to Green 2.
To transform this unique feature into a strong security
guarantee, the appropriate challenges must be constructed and
verified to ensure the consistency of responses. In practice, we
construct two types of challenge to be presented on front-end
screen: one is the background challenge displaying a single
color, and the other is the lighting challenge displaying a belt
of different color on the background color. The belt of the
different color from background is called the lighting area,
and one example is shown in Fig 6a, where the background
color is Red while the lighting area is Green.
To verify the consistency in responses, we defined another
concept called Region of Interest (ROI), which is the region
that the camera is scanning when the front-end screen is
1Since we just implemented those existing algorithms on face tracking,
detection and alignment, we will not provide further details about them and
interested readers can refer to original papers.
2Similar but a little bit different color patterns can also be observed on
cameras with row scanning mode. Column scanning mode is used here it is
easier to understand.
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(a) screen refreshing (b) camera refreshing
Fig. 5: Working schemes of screen and camera.
(a) lighting challenge (b) captured frame
Fig. 6: Example of lighting area and calculation of ROI.
displaying the lighting area. The location of ROI is calculated
as followings:
• Calculate tu, the start time to show the lighting area.
tu = tbegin +
u
rows
∗ tframe (3)
where u is the upper bound of lighting area, rows is
the number of rows contained in one frame, tbegin is
the start time to show the current frame, and tframe
is the during time of one frame.
• Find the captured frame which recording period covers
tu. Say the k-th captured frame.
• Calculate the shift, l, against the first column of k-th
captured frame.
l = cols ∗ tu − ctk
ctframe
(4)
where cols is the number of columns contained in one
captured frame, ctk is the start time to exposure the
first column of k-th capture frame, and ctframe is the
exposure time of one captured frame.
After finding the location of ROI, we distill it by apply-
ing Eq.(2) on every pixel between the response of lighting
challenge and background challenge. Two applied results are
demonstrated on Fig 7. Now, the consistence can be verified.
We check whether the lighting area can be correctly inferred
from the distilled ROI. If it cannot, the delay exists and this
response is counterfeit.
To infer the lighting area, we build 4 linear regression
models handling different part of captured frame (Fig 6b).
Each model is fed a vector, the average vector reduced from
corresponding part of ROI, and estimates the location of u+d2
independently. Next we gather estimated results according to
the size of each part. An example is shown on Fig 6b where the
ROI is separated into 2 parts: the left part contains a columns
and the right part contains b columns. The gathered result, yˆ,
is calculated as following.
yˆ =
a×m2 + b×m3
a+ b
(5)
where m2 and m3 denote the estimated result made by model
2 and model 3 respectively.
The final criteria of consistence is accumulated from yˆi,
the gathered result of i-th captured frame, as following:
di = yˆi − ui+di2
meand =
∑n
i=1 di
n
std2d =
∑n
i=1(di−meand)2
n−1
(6)
We finally check whether meand × stdd is smaller than
exp(Th), where Th is a predefined threshold.
Note that legitimate responses are consistent with our
challenges and will produce both small meand and stdd.
Adversarial responses will be detected by checking our final
criteria. An additional demo was illustrated on Fig 7 to explain
visually how the lighting area affects the captured frame.
(a) light middle area (b) light bottom area
Fig. 7: Effect of lighting area. In the bottom of both pictures,
these are mirrors showing the location of corresponding light-
ing area.
4) Face Verification: After preprocessing, we get a se-
quence frames with vibration removed, size unified and color
synchronized. Further, we use Eq.(1) to generate the midterm
result from the responses of a background challenge: First, we
randomly choose a pixel on the face as the anchor point; then,
we divide all the pixels by the value of that anchor point. Some
midterm results are shown on Fig 8.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Fig. 8: Examples of midterm results. (a) and (c) are captured from real human faces, (b) is captured from an iPad’s screen, (d)
and (e) are captured from a LCD monitor, and (f) is captured from a paper.
Without any difficulty, we can quickly differentiate results
of real human faces from fake ones. This is because real
human faces have uneven geometry and textures, while other
materials, like monitor, paper or iPad’s screen, do not have.
Based on this observation we developed our face verification
techniques, as described below.
• Step 1: abstract. We vertically divide the face into 20
regions. In every region, we further reduce the image
to a vector by taking the average value. Next, we
smooth every vector by performing polynomial fitting
of 20 degrees with minimal 2-norm deviation. After
that, we will derive images like Fig 9c.
• Step 2: resize. We pick out facial region and resize it to
a 20x20 image by bicubic interpolation. An example
is shown on Fig 9d.
• Step 3: verify. We feed the resized image to a well-
trained neural network, and the decision will be made
then.
The neural network we used contains 3 convolution layers
with a pyramid structure, which effectiveness was sufficiently
proved in Cifar-10, a dataset used to train the neural network
to classify 10 different objects. In Table I, we show the
architecture of our network and the parameters of every layer.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the security analysis of Face
Flashing. First, we abstract the mechanisms behind Face
(a) midterm result (b) midterm result
(c) abstract result
0
0
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(d) resize result
Fig. 9: Face verification.
Flashing as a challenge-response protocol. Second, we analyze
the security of two main parts in our protocol: timing verifica-
tions and face verification. Finally, we demonstrate how Face
Flashing defeats three typical advanced attacks.
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TABLE I: Architecture of Neural Network.
input size layer type stride padding size
20x20x3 conv 5x5 1 0
16x16x16 conv 3x3 1 1
16x16x16 pool 2x2 1 0
8x8x16 conv 3x3 1 1
8x8x32 pool 2x2 1 0
1x512 inner product 0 0
It is certain that Face Flashing can defeat static attacks,
as the expression detector, one component of our system, is
sufficient to defeat them. Specifically, static materials cannot
make expressions according to our instructions in time (e.g.,
1 second) and attacks using them will be failed by expression
detector. Besides, we conduct a series of experiments in
Section VI to demonstrate that the expression detector can
be correctly integrated with our other verifications. Therefore,
the main task of our security analysis is to show that Face
Flashing can defeat dynamic attacks.
A. A Challenge-Response Protocol
Face Flashing is a challenge-response protocol whose se-
curity guarantees are built upon three elements: unpredictable
random challenges, hardly forged responses, and the effective
response verifications.
The Challenges. Our challenge is a sequence of carefully-
crafted images that are generated at random. Since the front-
end devices are assumed to be well protected, adversaries
could not learn the random values. Besides, a verification
session consists of tens of challenges. Even if the adversary
can respond a right challenge by chance, it is unlikely for him
to respond to a sequence of challenges correctly.
The Responses. There are two important requirements for the
responses: First, the response must be easily generated by the
legitimate users, otherwise it may lead to usability problems or
even undermine the security guarantee (e.g., if adversaries can
generate fake responses faster than legitimate users). Secondly,
the responses should include essential characteristics of the
user, which are hard to be forged.
Face Flashing satisfies both requirements. The response is
the reflected light from the human face, and the user needs
to do nothing besides placing her face against the camera.
More importantly, such responses, in principle, are generated
at the speed of light, which is faster than any computational
process. Besides, the response carries unique characteristics of
the subject, such as the reflectance features of her face and
uneven geometry shapes, which are physical characteristics of
human faces that are inherently different from other media,
e.g., screens (major sources of security threats).
Response Verification. We use an in-depth defense strategy
to verify the responses and detect possible attacks.
• First, timing verification is used to prevent forged
responses (including replay attacks).
• Second, face verification is used to check if the subject
under authentication has a specific shape similar to a
real human face.
• Third, this face-like object must be regarded as the
same person with the victim by the face recognition
module (orthogonal to liveness detection).
Considering the pre-excluded static object, it is very hard
for adversaries to fabricate such a thing satisfying 3 rules above
simultaneously. In general, Face Flashing builds a high bar in
front of adversaries who want to impersonate the victim.
B. Security of Timing Verification
The goal of the timing verification is to detect the delay
in the response time caused by adversaries. Before further
analysis, we emphasize two points should be considered.
• First, according to the design of modern screens,
the adversary cannot update the picture that is being
displayed on the screen at the arbitrary time. In other
words, the adversary cannot interrupt the screen and
let it show the latest generated response before the
start of next refreshing period.
• Second, the camera is an integral device which accu-
mulates the light during his exposure period. And, at
any time, within an initialized camera, there always
exists some optical sensors are collecting the light.
For sake of clarity, we assume the front-end devices contain
a 60-fps camera and 60-Hz screen. On the other side, the
adversary has a more powerful camera with 240-fps and screen
with 240-Hz. Under these settings, we construct a typical
scenario to analyze our security, which time lines are shown
on Fig 10.
In this scenario, the screen of the front-end device is
displaying the i-th challenge, and the adversary aims to forge
the response to this challenge. The adversary may instantly
learn the location of lighting area of the challenge after tu.
While she cannot present the forged response on her screen
until vk, due to the nature of how the screen works. Hence,
there is a gap between tu and vk. Recalling our method
described in Section IV-B3, during the gap, some columns
in the ROI have already completed the refreshing process. In
other words, these columns’ image will not be affected by the
forged response displaying on the adversary’s screen during
vk to vk+1. We name this phenomenon as delay.
When delay happens, our camera will get an undesired
response inducing four linear regression models to do deviated
estimation about the location of lighting area. Besides, the
standard deviation of these estimations will increase, for two
reasons:
• The adversary’s screen can hardly be synchronized
with our screen. Particularly, it is different even the
length of adjacent refreshing periods. Hence, the delay
is unstable, so as the estimations.
• The precision of forging will be affected by the inter-
nal error of adversaries’ measurement about time. This
imprecision will be amplified again by our camera,
which fluctuates the estimations.
In other words, if the adversary reduces meand by dis-
playing the carefully-forged response, she will simultaneously
9
Our
Screen
Adv
Screen
lighting
area
lighting
area
ti ti+1tu td
vk−1 vk vk+1
Fig. 10: Security analysis on time.
increase stdd. On the other hand, if the adversary does nothing
to reduce stdd, she will significantly enlarge meand. While
for a benign user, the delay will not happen, the discordance
between our camera and screen can be solved by checking the
timestamps afterward, and both the accumulated meand and
stdd will be small, according to our verification algorithm.
In summary, we detect the delay by estimating the devia-
tion. And the effectiveness of our algorithm provides a strong
security guarantee on the timing verification.
C. Security of Face Verification
Our face verification abstracts the intrinsic information
of shape through a series of purification. And we feed this
information to a well-designed neural network.
If the adversary aims to bypass the face verification, there
are two conundrums that need to be resolved. First, the
adversary needs to conceal the specular reflection of the plain
screen. Particularly, during the authentication procedure, we
require the user to hold the phone so their face can occupy the
entire screen. The distance, as we measured, is about 20-cm. In
this short distance, the specular reflection is severe. In Fig 8b,
we demonstrate the result captured from a screen without any
covering sheet. Even covered by a scrub film (Fig 8d), the
screen’s specular reflection is still intense.
Second, the forged object must have similar geometry
shape with human faces. More precisely, its abstract result
should like a transpose of “H” (Fig 9c). And this stereo object
needs to make expression according to our instructions. Even
if the adversary can achieve these, there is no promise they can
deceive our strong neural network modal every time. And there
is no chance for the adversary to generate a response with low
quality. The high recall of our model will be demonstrated in
next section.
The above two conundrums provide the security guarantee
on face verification.
D. Security against typical attacks
Obviously, Face Flashing can defeat traditional attacks like
photo-based attacks. Here we discuss its defenses against three
typical advanced attacks:
Offline Attacks. An offline attack is to record responses of
previous authentications, and replay them to attack the current
authentication. However, this attack is impossible to fool our
protocol. First, the hitting possibility is small, as we require
responses match all the challenges. Concretely, if we use 8
different colors and present 10 lighting challenges, the hitting
possibility will be less than 10−9. Second, even if adversaries
have successfully guessed the correct challenge sequence, dis-
playing responses legitimately is difficult. Because displaying
on screens will produce the intensely specular reflection that is
easily detectable, and displayed by projecting responses onto
a forged object leads to high stdd that also can be detected,
as adversaries cannot precisely predict the length of every
refreshing period of the screen.
MFF Attacks. An MFF attack is to forge the response by
merging victim’s facial information and the currently received
challenge. However, this attack is also useless, because it is
hard to deceive our timing and face verifications simultane-
ously. First, to deceive our face verification needs forging high-
quality responses which is difficult and time-consuming. Par-
ticularly, high-quality forgery requires reconstructing the 3D
model of victim’s face and simulating the reflection process.
Second, to deceive our timing verification needs to complete
the above forgery quickly. Actually, the available time is 1240/2
second for attacking a 60 Hz screen (Section VI-B). Third,
even if adversaries can quickly produce a perfectly forged
response, displaying the response is not allowed (see the
preceding paragraph).
3D-Mask Attacks. A 3D-mask attack is to wear a 3D mask
to impersonate the victim. However, this attack is impractical.
First, this attack needs to build an accurate mask that can
fool our face recognition module, which is difficult3. Second,
the legitimate mask is hard to be 3D printed. As the printed
mask needs to have the similar reflectance of human skin and
be so flexible that adversaries can wear it to make instructed
expressions. While, the available 3D printed materials are non-
flexible under the requirement of Fused Deposition Modeling
(FDM), the prevalent 3D print technology. Besides, the small-
est diameter of available nozzles is 0.35mm that will produce
coarse surfaces, and coarse surfaces can be distinguished from
human skin.
In sum, Face Flashing is powerful to defeat advanced
attacks, especially attacks similar to the ones mentioned above.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we introduce the source of our collected
data at the beginning, then present implementations and eval-
uations of timing and face verifications, followed by the
evaluation on robustness. Finally, we give the computational
and storage cost when deploying our system on a smartphone
and the back-end server.
A. Data Collection
We have invited 174 participants including Asian, Euro-
pean and African. Among all participants, there are 111 males
and 63 females with ages ranging from 17 to 52. During the
experiment, participants were asked to hold a mobile phone
facing to their face and make expressions such as smiling,
blinking or moving head slightly. A button was located at the
bottom of the screen so that participants can click it to start
3Even though there is an existing study implying it is possible [19],
performing it in real is not easy.
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Fig. 11: Performance of 4 regression models. (a)-(d) shows
performance of model 1-4 respectively.
(and stop) the authentication/liveness detection process. When
started, the phone performs our challenge-response protocol
and records a video with its front camera. And, once started,
that button will be disabled for three seconds to ensure that
every captured video contains at least 90 frames.
In total, we collect 2274 raw videos under six different
settings (elaborated in Section VI-D). In each scenario, we
randomly select 50 videos to form the testing data set, and all
other videos then belong to the training data set.
B. Timing Verification
In our implementation of timing verification, we set the
height of lighting area in every lighting challenge to a constant,
i.e., u − d = 1/4, where the height of the whole screen is 1.
And we use an open source library, LIBLINEAR [6], to do the
regression with L2-loss and L2-regularization, where the Th
is set to −5.
We trained four regression models on the training set
mentioned above, and their performances over the testing data
set are shown on Fig 11. It shows that performances of model
1 and 4 are relatively poor which is reasonable in fact, because
both models handle two challenging areas (refer to Fig 6)
where the responses are weak and the keen edges also impair
the results.
To evaluate its capability on defending against attacks, we
feed forged areas (see Fig 12a) to these regression models, and
observe the results. It turns out that when enlarging the shift
between real ROI and forged area, the estimation deviation
increases. In Fig 12b, we illustrated the relationship between
estimated meand and stdd under different values of shift,
while regularizing the width of ROI as 1. The figure shows that
when shift is less than 0.1, the estimation error of meand and
stdd is very small. But when the shift is 0.5, the estimation
error is around 1/4. In other words, when increasing shift
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Fig. 12: Attack simulation
to the half of ROI’s width, the estimated deviation could be
larger than the height of the lighting area, which states that
adversary’s opportunity window (i.e., shift) for a successful
attack is pretty small, and our method can reliably detect such
attacks. Concretely, the acceptable delay for a benign response
is less than 1240/2 second for a 60 Hz screen.
Further, we investigated the delays under a real-world
setting (shown in Fig 13). In this experiment, we used two
devices: A is the authenticator (a Nexus 6 smartphone in this
example), and B is the attacker (a laptop that will reproduce the
color displayed on smartphone by simply showing the video
captured by its front camera). When the experiment begins,
the smartphone starts to flash with random colors, and record
whatever is displayed on laptop screen at the same time, then
calculate the delay needed by attackers to reproduce the same
color. The same procedure will be repeated to calculate the
delays by replacing the laptop with a mirror.
Fig 13b shows the results where the blue bars are mirror’s
delays while the red bars are the laptop’s delays. The difference
between the delays means that if adversaries had used devices
other than mirrors to reproduce the reflected colors (i.e. re-
sponses), there should be significant delays. This is actually
one of our major technical contribution to use light reflections
instead of human expressions and/or actions as the responses
to given challenges, and it can give a clear and strong timing
guarantee to differentiate genuie and fake responses.
C. Face Verification
We use Caffe [10], an open source deep learning frame-
work, to train our neural network model used for face verifi-
cation. The preliminary parameters are listed below: learning
policy is set to “multistep”, base learning rate is 0.1, gamma
is 0.1, momentum is 0.9, weight decay is 0.0001 and the max
iteration is 64000.
We first build a set of adversarial videos in order to train
the model. These videos are made by recording the screen that
is replaying the raw video. There are 4 different screens are
recorded (Table II).
We take those frames in malicious videos as our negative
samples, and take those raw videos’ frames as positive sam-
ples. Besides, we bypass our timing verification to eliminate
the mutual effect between these two verification algorithms.
The experimental results are listed in the Table III, which
shows a zero false positive error with 99.2% of accuracy rate.
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Fig. 13: Primitive attack.
TABLE II: Four different screens.
Screen Resolution Pixel Density
1 HUAWEI P10 1920*1080 432(ppi)
2 iPhone SE 1136*640 326(ppi)
3 AOC Monitor (e2450Swh) 1920*1080 93(ppi)
4 EIZO Monitor (ev2455) 1920*1200 95(ppi)
When applied with the testing data set, the accuracy is
98.8%. There are only 75 frames are incorrectly labeled, with
all the negative samples labeled correctly. After analyzing these
75 frames, we found it may result from three reasons:
• Illumination. When the distance between face and
screen is far and the environmental illumination is
high, the captured response will be too obscure to be
labeled correctly.
• Saturation. Due to device limitations, video frames
taken in dark scenarios, will have many saturated
pixels, even having adjusted the sensitivity of optical
sensors. As described in Section IV-B1, it is necessary
to remove these saturated pixels to satisfy the formu-
las.
TABLE III: Experimental results of face verification.
Training Ps Training Ns Testing Ps Testing Ns
Total 20931 20931 3000 3000
Incorrect 329 0 75 0
• Vibration. Drastic head shaking and intensive vibra-
tion also fades our performance. Especially, we will
not do so well on frames at the beginning and end of
the captured video.
The above results showed that we can detect all the attacks
with a small false negative error, which provides another secu-
rity guarantee besides the response timing mentioned above.
D. Evaluation on Robustness
There are mainly two elements that could affect the per-
formance of our proposed method: illumination and vibration.
We have carefully designed six scenarios to further investigate
their impacts.
• scenario 1: We instruct participants to stand in a
continuous lighting room as motionless as possible.
And the button was hidden during the first 15 seconds
to let participants produce a long video clip.
• scenario 2: We instruct participants to take a subway
train. The vibration is intermittent and lighting condi-
tion is changing all the time.
• scenario 3: We instruct participants to walk on our
campus as they usually do during a sunny day.
• scenario 4: We instruct participants to hover under
penthouses during a cloudy day.
• scenario 5: We instruct participants to walk downstairs
at their usual speed in rooms.
• scenario 6: We instruct participants to walk down a
slope outside during nights.
We summarize the features of these scenarios in Table IV.
The results are shown on Fig 14. In ideal environments
(scenario 1), our method is perfect and the accuracy is high
as 99.83%. In normal cases (scenario 4), our method is also
excellent with the 99.17% accuracy. And the sunlight (scenario
3) causes ignorable effects on the result, as long as the frontal
camera does not face the sun directly. Comparing scenario
5 with 3, we infer the vibration causes more effect than the
sunlight. Besides, dark is a devil (scenario 6) which reduces
the accuracy to 97.33%, the lowest one. In our method,
we cannot use the function of auto white balance (AWB)
embedded in our devices, due to the fundamental requirement
of our method. Adjusting the sensitivity of sensors, we just
can limitedly reduce the effect of saturation, while keeping
enough effectiveness. Limited by this constraint, the result is
acceptable. For the complex case (scenario 2), the accuracy,
97.83%, is not bad. In this scenario, our device is being tested
by many factors including unpredictable impacts, glare lamps
and quickly changed shadows.
To further explore the impacts caused by vibrations, we
built another experiment where we leveraged the six parame-
ters generated by face tracking algorithm, and assembled them
as a single value, ν, to measure the intensity of vibration.
The details are illustrated in Algorithm 2, where {Tj} is the
sequence of the transformation matrix (Section IV-B2) and N
is the number of frames.
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TABLE IV: Features of scenes.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6
Illumination good varying intense normal normal dark
Vibration no intermittent normal normal intense intense
1 2 3 4 5 6
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Fig. 14: Performance on different scenarios.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm to measure intensity of vibration.
INPUT: {Tj}, N
OUTPUT: ν
1: for j = 1 to N do
2: Extract face shifting, (αj , βj , γj)
3: Extract face rotation, (ιj , ζj , ηj)
4: end for
5: Calculate mean values: α¯, β¯, γ¯, ι¯, ζ¯ and η¯
6: for i = j to N do
7: µj =
αj
α¯ +
βj
β¯
+
γj
γ¯ +
ιj
ι¯ +
ζj
ζ¯
+
ηj
η¯
8: end for
9: ν = std({µj})
Fig 15a shows the distribution of intensity. And Fig 15b
shows the relation between vibration intensity and accuracy.
We divided all the intensity by the maximum value. From both
figures, we can infer that vibration will produce side effects
to our method and the most drastic vibration will reduce the
accuracy to 60%. But, in general cases where the vibration is
not that big, our method can perform very well. This means
our method indeed is robust under normal vibration conditions.
Particularly, when the intensity reaches 0.5, we still hold 89%
accuracy.
0 0.5 1
vibration
0
5
10
15
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
(%
)
(a) distribution
0 0.5 1
vibration
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
a
cc
u
ra
cy
(b) relation
Fig. 15: Vibration effect.
In conclusion, our good robustness to vibration and illumi-
nation provides a good reliability and user experience. Besides,
it excludes a potential attack scenario where adversary naively
increases the vibration density.
E. Computational and Storage Cost
The time costs of our method depend on concrete devices.
If we run our method in the back-end server (say a laptop), the
time needed to deal with 300 frames is less than 1 seconds,
and the difference among time costs of our 3 steps is subtle.
Here, we amplify this difference by running our method on a
smartphone (Nexus 6) with a single core, and the resolution
of all the frames are kept on 1920*1080. The time costs are
shown in Table V.
TABLE V: Time cost of implementation on smartphone.
Number of frames 50 100 200 300
Face extraction 6.11 11.70 20.12 28.63
Timing verification 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.22
Face verification 0.08 0.12 0.20 0.27
Total 6.22 (s) 11.87 (s) 20.43 (s) 29.12 (s)
We discover that the most time-consuming step is the face
extraction, which depends on algorithms we choose and the
precision of face detection we want to achieve. The lower
precision, the lower resolution of the input frame is needed
and thus less time is needed. Particularly, if we shrink the
input frame to half its size, the time will be reduced to about
1 second to extract the faces on 50 frames. The other way
to reduce the time cost is leveraging the back-end server
(the Cloud) in parallel, as we mentioned above. In practice,
we keep the camera continuously recording the user’s video
and, parallely, sent “.mp4” files with each containing 30
frames recorded in one second, to our server through a 4G
network (with about 12 Mbps of bandwidth in our experiment)
for every second. Transferring one that file will consume
1.1 MB bandwidth. Once receiving a video, the server will
perform our verifications on it and judge whether the user is
benign. If the result of any second is negative, we regard this
whole authentication session as a malicious attempt. Table VI
demonstrates the time cost of this process. Compared with
the implementation only on the smartphone, using cloud can
significantly reduces the waiting and thus greatly improved
user experiences.
TABLE VI: Time cost of implementation using cloud.
Number of frames 50 100 200 300
Recording in Front 1.67 3.34 6.67 10
Verifying in Cloud 2.22 3.62 7.21 10.82
Time to Wait 0.55 (s) 0.28 (s) 0.54 (s) 0.82 (s)
The storage space we need is the same as the size of
captured videos, and the storage complexity is O(NM). In
real tests, 8.3Mb memory space is enough to store a video
consisting 100 frames in JPG format.
VII. RELATED WORKS
Various liveness detection techniques have been proposed
in the past decades. In this section, we discuss differences
between our method and those most relevant previous studies.
Our method could be categorized as a texture extrac-
tion method, according to the classification in Chakraborty’s
survey [5]. The traditional methods in this category mainly
13
use various descriptors to extract features of images and
pass features through a classifier to obtain the final result.
For instance, Arashloo et al. [2] used multi-scale dynamic
binarized statical features; Benlamoudi et al. [2] used active
shape models with steam and LBP; Wen et al. [25] analyzed
distortion using 4 different features, etc. These methods work
well under experimental conditions. But in our adversary
model, the attacker can forge a perfect face that would defeat
their approaches. In contrast, our method checks the geometric
shape of the subject under authentication, and detect whether
there are abnormal delays between responses and challenges.
Even the adversary is technically capable of creating a perfect
forged response, the time required in doing so will fail them.
Besides, previous works may fail due to the sub-optimal
environmental conditions. However, our method is robust to
that, as demonstrated in the evaluation part.
Our method is also a challenge-response protocol. The
traditional protocols are based on human reactions. Comparing
to them, our responses can be generated at the speed of light.
Li et al. [17] proposed a new protocol that records the inertial
sensors’ data while the user is moving around the mobile
phone. If the data is consistent with the video captured by
the mobile phone, the user is judged as a legitimate one. This
method’s challenge is the movement of mobile phone which
is controlled by the user and measured by sensors. And the
response is user’s facial video which is also produced by the
user. This method’s security guarantee is based on the precise
estimation of head poses. But we argued that the accuracy
cannot be high enough in wild environment for two reasons:
first, as mentioned by the authors, the estimation algorithm has
about 7 degrees deviation; second, hand trembling produces
side effect to the precision of the mobile sensors. In contrast,
our approach is more robust, because, firstly, the challenges
are fully out of attackers’ control, and, secondly, our security
guarantees are based on detecting the indelible delay, rather
than the accurate estimation of the unstable head position.
Besides above methods, there is a close work published
by Kim et al. [12] who found that the diffusion speed is
the distinguishing characteristic between real faces and fake
faces. The reason is that the real face has more stereo shape
which makes the reflection random and irregular. But this
passive method will not work, when the environmental light
is inefficient. From the figures shown in their paper, we can
hardly distinguish the so-called binarized reflectance maps
of malicious responses from legitimate responses, and these
”vague” maps are fed to SVM for the final decision. So we
argue that this approach cannot defeat such attackers who have
the ability to forge a perfect fake face. In contrast, our security
guarantee is not only based on the stereo shape, but also the
delay between responses and challenges. It’s a very high bar
for adversaries to forge a perfect response in such critical time.
Another method leveraging reflection is proposed by Rudd et
al. [20]. The authors added two different polarization devices
on the camera. And these devices impede the most of incoming
light except the light in the particular direction. Comparing to
this approach, our method does not require special devices and
is more practical to use.
Specially, our work has overlaps with Andrew Bud’s
patent [4] using also the light reflection to do the authentica-
tion. However, we focus on the security instead of functionality
as they have done. Without our timing verification, as we
demonstrated, there is no security guarantee and it is weak
to defend against MFF attacks. And our work is independent
from theirs.
In general, compared with above relative works, Face
Flashing is an active and effective approach with strong
security guarantee on time.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Resilience to novel attacks. An attack proposed by Mahmood
et al. [21] demonstrated that an attacker could impersonate
the victim by placing a customized mask around his eyes.
Although such an attack can deceive the state-of-the-art face
recognition system, however, we believe it will be defeated
by our method, as paper masks around the eyes can be easily
detected by our neural network model in the verification of
face (see Fig 8a and 8c).
Challenge colors. We used 8 different colors in our exper-
iments. Considering the length of our challenge sequence,
we believe these 8 colors are enough to provide a strong
security guarantee. Because our security guarantee is achieved
by detecting the delays. If the adversary falsely infers one
challenge, the delay will be detected and her attempt will
fail. Of course, we can easily increase the space of the
challenge sequences by using the striped pictures with a more
sophisticated algorithm.
Authentication time. Our method needs a few seconds to
gather enough responses for authentication. As we mentioned
in data collection’s part, 3 seconds is a reasonable default
setting. In this period, we can choose sufficient responses
with high quality, and the user can complete the instructed
expression. Essentially, 1 second is enough for our method to
finish the work, but the user will be in a hurry.
Other applications of our techniques. One interesting appli-
cation of our method is to improve the accuracy of state-of-
the-art face recognition algorithms by distilling the personal
information contained in the geometric shape. We believe the
shape is unique. The combined method will have stronger
ability to prevent advanced future attacks.
IX. LIMITATIONS
The silicone mask may pass our system. But, this mask is
hard to be fabricated (3D printed) due to the reasons mentioned
in Section II-B. And our system has the potential to defeat it
completely, owing to our unique challenges: lights of different
wavelength (colors). According to previous studies [26], light
reflected from human skin has an “albedo curve”, the curve
depicting reflectance of different wavelengths. Therefore, the
reflections from different surfaces can be distinguished by
discernible albedo curves, which enables Face Flashing to
recognize attackers wearing such “soft” masks. However, this
technique is sophisticated and deserves another paper.
Even though we raise the bar of the attacks, we cannot
totally neutralize adversaries’ advantages coming from super
devices. They still have a chance to pass our system, if they
somehow use an ultrahigh-speed camera (FASTCAM SA1.1
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with 675000fps), an ultrahigh-speed screen in the similar
level (says with 100000Hz), and the solution to reduce the
transmission and buffering delays. In this situation, adversaries
can instantly forge the response to every challenge with small
delays and subtle variance, so our protocol will fail. However,
this attack is expensive and sophisticated. On the other side,
we can mitigate this threat, to some extent, by flashing more
finely striped challenges (or chessboard-like patterns), but, with
better screen and camera.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel challenge-response
protocol, Face Flashing, to defeat the main threats against
face authentication system—the 2D dynamic attacks. We have
systematically analyzed our method and illustrated that our
method has strong security guarantees. We implemented a
prototype that does verifications both on time and the face.
We have demonstrated that our method has high accuracy in
various environments and is robust to vibration and illumina-
tion. Experimental results prove that our protocol is effective
and efficient.
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